Some people relate to, and treat, humanoid robots as if they are human, although they know that they are not. Such reactions have sparked discussion about whether humanoid robots should be granted the same, or similar, moral status as human beings. A relational approach to robot moral status is unconcerned with whether the robot has the necessary properties for moral status, and argues that if we relate to the robot as if it is human, it should indeed have the same (or similar) moral status as human beings. Alternatively, a properties-based approach argues that the moral status of robots is fundamentally concerned with what goes on “on the inside” (i.e. whether robots have the internal properties necessary to be granted moral status, such as sentience or consciousness). Relational and property-based approaches are at odds with one another, and frame the debate as an “either-or” situation in which either humanoid robots have moral status, or none at all. This paper argues against an either/or approach and charts a third course to consider. By drawing upon Thaddeus Metz’s African-inspired theory of modal-relational moral status, in which properties play an important role, it argues that humanoid robots warrant their own category of moral status, within our societal moral hierarchy. This approach has the added advantage of taking the discussion beyond that of Western philosophical frameworks. Moreover, it makes a further contribution by highlighting the theoretical contribution of Metz’s theory to the current debate. 

Part of the panel Rethinking AI Ethics in, for and from sub-Saharan Africa