Naturalistic moral epistemologists have recently argued that there are distinct social factors and forces under which moral progress – or regress – are likely to occur. According to Smyth (in prep.) current technological trends in many societies are conducive to moral regress: whereas once technology freed humans and encouraged the formation of new ends and experiences, much of it now forces humans down conditioning pathways where we end up pursuing remarkably simple and uniform goals. In this presentation I criticize Smyth’s assessment on three philosophical grounds. First, I argue that the theoretical framework of naturalistic epistemologists should not be understood in deterministic fashion. Second, I argue that the framework of naturalistic epistemologists is well-suited to scrutinize historical episodes of progress and regress, but that modesty is called for when applying it to our current predicament. Third, I argue that the dynamics Smyth identifies are likely to accelerate processes of technomoral change, which may aggravate normative uncertainty. I conclude that, although these factors limit the explanatory scope of naturalistic epistemology with regard to assessments of contemporary moral progress and regress, the overall approach still has merit.

This presentation is part of the panel The Ethics of Progress