“Technosocial disruption” affects “deeply held beliefs, values, social norms, and basic human capacities”, “basic human practices, fundamental concepts, [and] ontological distinctions” (Hopster 2021: 6). For this reason, it is also referred to as “deep disruption” (ibid.). It brings about different kinds of uncertainty, including “conceptual ambiguity and contestation, moral confusion, and moral disagreement” (ibid.: 7). Among such deep disruptions are disruptions of fundamental concepts. When a deep conceptual disruption happens, our usual ways of applying concepts without much reflection are interrupted . In this talk, I argue that such deep conceptual disruptions can lead to deep moral disagreement, and that overcoming such disagreement can result in moral progress, for instance in the form of recognising and overcoming an epistemic injustice. My argument combines insights from the later Wittgenstein that inspired some views on deep disagreement with insights from ongoing research on technology-induced social and conceptual disruption. I argue that overcoming deep disagreements requires re-establishing common ground among the disagreeing parties. That common ground does not only consist of shared beliefs and preferences but also of shared concepts and agreement on how to apply them. Shared concepts are part of the common ground that “normal” disagreements presuppose. Deep disagreements are rationally irresolvable given the current conceptual repertoire of the disagreeing parties. A way in which a conceptual disruption can contribute to moral progress is by helping to overcome an epistemic injustice. If, for instance, a lack of shared concepts can lead to hermeneutical injustice, the creation of shared concepts can be a way of overcoming such an injustice.

This presentation is part of the panel The Ethics of Progress