In recent work on conceptual engineering in the philosophy of technology, conceptual engineering has been proposed as a meaningful way to bridge instances of conceptual disruption. Such proposals predominantly focus on conceptual engineering in terms of curative interventions of conceptual issues.
In this paper, we investigate whether conceptual engineering should also be considered as a means of prevention. That is, should conceptual engineering interventions following instances of conceptual disruption focus both on bridging existing conceptual disruptions and on preventing future ones? In particular, we focus our attention on moral concepts. In other words, should we (re-)engineer moral concepts for resilience?
To this end, we explore the notion of resilience in relation to conceptual disruption and engineering. We identify two facets of resilience, which in turn open up the possibility of exploring different philosophical traditions. First, a concept is resilient when it is able to withstand conceptual disruption. The idea of withstanding here means not undergoing a change that would qualify as a conceptual disruption, but remaining unaffected. This resonates with a broadly Western philosophical understanding of immutability and the valorisation of the unchanging.
Second, a concept is resilient when it is able to accommodate change. In this sense, a concept is resistant to conceptual disruption not because it is immutable, but because it constantly adapts to change, thus never losing its functional adequacy. This is consistent with the Chinese philosophical tradition, which considers skillful adaptation to change as an ideal. Moreover, this seems to align with the Western understanding of thin moral concepts. Indeed, the feature of resilience seems to be more commonly present in thin(er) moral concepts which, being less easily captured by definitions, seem to exhibit a greater ability to adapt to change.
Ultimately, we argue that there is a benefit in favouring thin(ner) or thick(er) concepts under certain conditions, e.g., when foundational moral concepts are involved. At the same time, thin(ner) concepts are not necessarily more practically useful than thick(er) ones. Therefore, it may not always be advisable for conceptual engineers to (re-)engineer moral concepts for resilience.