Socially disruptive technologies have been described as technologies that disturb or significantly alter social practices. In terms of the social practice of ethical evaluation, new technologies can lead to misapplication or blurring of philosophical concepts. Consequently, ethics' function of practical guidance may be compromised, creating moral uncertainty.

Within practical ethics, the discipline of bioethics has a long history of addressing and mitigating moral uncertainty that accompanies the implementation of new technologies. For example, the refinement of life-sustaining technologies have had significant implications for the concepts of death and personhood. Regarding practical guidance, bioethics has developed a range of methods, such as principle-based approaches, casuistry and reflective equilibrium, to mitigate moral uncertainty. Thus, bioethics already provides a good methodological basis for addressing moral uncertainty following disruptive technologies.
Against this background, it is crucial to identify where the two approaches overlap and where they complement each other. I discuss two aspects. First, unlike previous analyses in bioethics, the concept of socially disruptive technologies can provide deeper insights into the reasons why certain new technologies are disruptive while others are not. In terms of technology assessment, this would be promising for the ability to anticipate disruptions and, where necessary, to reduce harm. However, this requires a clear demarcation between disruption and mere change following the introduction of a new technology, which is currently lacking. Second, the concept of socially disruptive technologies may broaden the view of the extent to which technologies can transform social institutions. While bioethics and its main sub-disciplines medical ethics, animal ethics and environmental ethics often restrict the assessment of e.g. negative consequences to their respective domains (medicine, animals, environment), a focus on social institutions may be able to integrate different domains and interrelated changes.

By outlining methods such as principle-based approaches, casuistry and reflective equilibrium, I will explore how bioethics provides resources to mitigate some forms of social disruption. In turn, I will use the concept of socially disruptive technologies to attempt to delineate where bioethical methodology is limited in the face of profound technological transformations, and where new approaches are needed to restore practical guidance.