Why is there an ethics of X for some X but not others? There is a thriving academic research program of medical ethics, but not of the ethics of travel or of fashion. In this paper, I explore this question and apply it to AI and other information technologies. Is there a distinctive ethics of AI or ML or can they be subsumed under a broader type of applied ethics of technology? Recently, Heilinger 2022 has suggested that thinking there is a distinctive ethics of AI is as misguided as thinking there is a distinctive ethics of electricity.

During the founding of computer ethics in the 90s by James Moor, this question was also debated. Walter Maner and Donald Gotterbarn disagreed over whether there was a unique ethics of computing. 

I will argue that the question whether there is a substantial ethics of X depends in part on the question of whether there are unresolved conceptual questions about X, for instance due to the breakdown of ordinary concepts. In situations like this, research in applied ethics might consist of conceptual adjustment or choice. This type of applied ethics differs in methodology both from pure philosophical ethics and also from empirical research. I will connect this debate to recent work by Dasgupta who has argued that some issues in AI ethics are cosmopolitan, and not merely parochial.