In Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory (Luhmann, 1995), society is characterized by an array of functionally differentiated subsystems comprising of communication. Included among these subsystems are the scientific subsystem, the technological subsystem, the moral subsystem and so on. Each of these subsystems is unique and conceives of problems in society by making use of their own logic, resulting in a situation where each subsystem presents different solutions to problems in society.

The paper delves into the intersection of virtue ethics, postphenomenology, and technology to explore the roles ethical virtues may play in technological design. It employs the neo-Aristotelian praxeological methodology from Alasdair MacIntyre, focusing on the virtues of the moral agent as an independent practical reasoner but also as a socially and biologically dependent animal. It also integrates contributions from Ihde’s and Verbeek’s Postphenomenology, which explore morally and technologically mediated agents. 

In an influential paper, Verbeek has suggested to expand the (post-)phenomenological repertoire of describing human-technology relations with the cyborg relation to capture what is at stake when “the human and the technological actually merge rather than ‘merely’ being embodied” (Verbeek, 2008, p. 391). According to Verbeek, a new entity emerges when humans use implanted technologies such as neurotechnology, antidepressants, or pacemakers.