This paper introduces a novel theoretical approach to understanding artefact functions by advocating for a "normative functions" account, inspired by the literature on conceptual functions in philosophy. Normative functions of concepts are, roughly, things that they allow us to do that matter normatively (for example, things in virtue of which we have normative reasons to have these concepts).

In the field of digital ethics, the question has been asked regularly whether digital ethics is unique in the kinds of ethical issues it raises, moral principles it requires or methods or approaches it is in need of. A debate on this issue took place between 1985 and 2002, and has been titled the uniqueness debate within digital ethics (or computer ethics, at the time). Various authors, such as Deborah Jpohnson, Walter Maner, Krystyna Gorniak-Kocikowska and Luciano Floridi, made arguments in favor of uniqueness.

A high-level virtue ethics approach to situations of deep uncertainty would complement and/or contrast with consequentialist and deontological approaches to uncertainty. Such an account would satisfy the following criteria: (1) it provides normative guidance that allows individuals and societies to cope with deep uncertainty ethically and sustainably in the presence of strong emotions of fear, apprehension, and anxiety; (2) it allows for responsiveness to unexpected situations (“black swans” (Taleb 2007)); and (3) it is realistically accessible to ordinary people.