Why is there an ethics of X for some X but not others? There is a thriving academic research program of medical ethics, but not of the ethics of travel or of fashion. In this paper, I explore this question and apply it to AI and other information technologies. Is there a distinctive ethics of AI or ML or can they be subsumed under a broader type of applied ethics of technology? Recently, Heilinger 2022 has suggested that thinking there is a distinctive ethics of AI is as misguided as thinking there is a distinctive ethics of electricity.

Technological artefacts have become “world objects” – they affect the world as a whole. This becomes increasingly evident considering the imprint of their development and use on our global natural environment. The growing awareness of the entanglement of humans, their practices, and their technological artefacts with their natural environments goes along with growing uncertainty. The rising number of experiences with the catastrophic consequences of climate change and environmental crises are increasingly shaking many people’s belief in a stable course of life and of the future.

The theme of technological breakdown, error, failure, or malfunction has, in a certain way, always been present in the history of the philosophy of technology. From Heidegger’s hammer to contemporary discussion of algorithmic bias, technological failure has been seen as revealing of something, as a means to obtain knowledge about technology or the world. For example, Verbeek (2004, p.