One would be excused to think that values are just “bullshit” - to use the philosophical term successfully brought from slang into philosophy by Harry Frankfurt (Frankfurt 2005). This is because both values (e.g., liberty, equality, justice) and meta-values (e.g., Ruth Chang’s parity, Michael Walzer’s complex equality) underdetermine the design process and can even be applied contradictorily on the same decision. For example, one and the same technology can be described as sustainable and not-sustainable, as serving/promoting and not promoting freedom.

In recent years the role of public values have gained significant importance, both in technology assessment and as guidelines for government policy of technology (for one example see the value-driven approach to digitalization of the Dutch government, final draft November 2022). A practical explanation for the uptake of public values is that while they carry normative weight, this weight can be flexibly applied depending on context and also depending on possible trade-offs between the values at stake.

This paper introduces a novel theoretical approach to understanding artefact functions by advocating for a "normative functions" account, inspired by the literature on conceptual functions in philosophy. Normative functions of concepts are, roughly, things that they allow us to do that matter normatively (for example, things in virtue of which we have normative reasons to have these concepts).

Social media algorithms severely limit our interactions and exposure to other perspectives. However, individuals could still have a responsibility regarding their engagement online. Current literature focuses mostly on echo chambers, algorithmic control, and misinformation. Echo chambers are defined by manipulation whereas epistemic bubbles can be innocently or accidentally exclusive. Instead of algorithms, I consider the role people play in creating social media epistemic bubbles (SMEBs) and the consequential harms on one’s epistemic norms and status as a knower.

In recent virtue ethics literature, attempts at explaining certain virtues in greater details have become of interest. We see this attempt as an answer to broad-range criticism on virtue ethics as not being action guiding. At the same time, virtues ethics finds a renewed interest in the ethics of technology (Bergen and Robaey, 2022). We find a point of tension in the virtue of curiosity and the practice of research and innovation.

The phrase "socially disruptive" is used to characterize a bewildering range of technologies. There is a need for an apt definition of "Socially Disruptive Technologies" (SDTs), particularly for a definition that captures their ethically relevant implications – positive and negative – in ways that are suitably contextualized. In this paper, we propose, explain, and defend the following definition:

Real-world experimentation is an important strategy for developing robust and responsible emerging technologies such as AI, robotics, and smart city applications. While real-world experimentation might benefit the development of responsible digital technologies or help solve ‘grand challenges,’ attention should be paid to conducting these experiments responsibly. However, the moral responsibilities of this real-world experimentation are often left unaddressed and unregulated.

In the field of digital ethics, the question has been asked regularly whether digital ethics is unique in the kinds of ethical issues it raises, moral principles it requires or methods or approaches it is in need of. A debate on this issue took place between 1985 and 2002, and has been titled the uniqueness debate within digital ethics (or computer ethics, at the time). Various authors, such as Deborah Jpohnson, Walter Maner, Krystyna Gorniak-Kocikowska and Luciano Floridi, made arguments in favor of uniqueness.

The main problem that the paper presentation will concentrate on concerns the place of ethics in the current European Union (EU) efforts to steer the hectically advancing realm of science and technology (S&T) towards breakthrough and disruptive innovation. It will attempt to reveal how the change in the EU research and innovation (R&I) policy impacts the role of ethics in the overall governance of the sector.

In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in Socially Disruptive Technologies (Hopster 2021) and the phenomenon of conceptual disruption in the fields of philosophy and ethics of technology (Löhr 2023). Additionally, topics regarding conceptual engineering have risen to prominence. This presentation contributes to these areas of research by examining the categorization system of technology-induced conceptual disruptions, which could potentially limit conceptual engineering. This presentation has three objectives.

The concept ‘refusal’ in relation to Artificial Intelligence (AI) has attracted increased attention (e.g., Pereira, 2021). The overturning of Roe v Wade in 2022, ending the right to abortion in the U.S., led Pro-choice advocates to develop Chatbot Charley (2024) to refuse this decision. Charley confidentially provides information regarding safe abortions and trustworthy doctors. It gives access to networks of knowledge critical to political concerns such as bodily autonomy, privacy, and epistemic justice.

Work on value alignment focuses on ensuring that human values are respected by AI systems. However, existing approaches tend to rely on universal framings of human values that obscure the question of what values the systems should elicit and align with, given a variety of operational contexts. Here, many ethical guidelines exist, yet translating these into actionable steps to follow in developers' decision-making processes has proven to be far removed from the vast array of scientific, technical, and economic contexts, leading to confusion and negligible impact. 

Too often privacy and security are considered to be opposed values. But a more realistic balance between these two can be realized when we acknowledge that both concepts have different meanings. They root in various forms of surveillance, that are embedded in western culture. 

Algorithmic hiring technologies, i.e. Artificial Intelligence (AI) tools for Human Resource Management (HRM) that are used to find and select candidates for job openings, have been increasingly used to improve recruitment efficency. However, these tools have also been proven to perpetuate discrimination for marginalised groups in society.

This paper utilizes Derrida’s philosophy of tele-technology to examine how social media shapes perceptions of religious violence. Although Derrida did not witness the advent of social media, he already saw how the widespread ownership of television and the accessibility of portable cameras in the late 50s and 60s marked a turning point in our ‘access’ to events all over the world. Today, social media has intensified this access further, as the digitization of our lifeworld provides unparalleled access to free information.

Piloting and pilots are a key element in innovation policy. The European Union innovation policy steers funding for projects leaning on piloting through its research and innovation programmes, and the experimental approach is also embedded in its policies on emerging technologies. At the same time, all research and innovation funding through the EU mechanisms subscribe to the principles of Responsible Research and Innovation that guide practises concerning co-creation and transdisciplinary interaction. 

This paper presents a reflective case study in conceptual engineering by considering whether and how the concept of ‘control’ might need revision My primary aim is not to propose a new concept of ‘control but rather to learn about (the process of) conceptual engineering.

Philosophers have been interested in how technological change can drive changes in values (Hopster et al. 2022; Danaher 2021; Swierstra 2013; Nickel, Kudina, and van de Poel 2021) and many have also proposed that particular causal histories can vindicate or debunk our confidence in certain values (Street 2006; Queloz 2021; Smyth 2020). For either inquiry we need robust evidence of technologically induced value change and of the causal mechanisms behind it. In my paper I offer such evidence of technology-driven value change and propose a vindicating argument for this value.

This paper argues that the concept of performativity can help us gain a better understanding of the relation between how we conceptualize ‘technology’ and our ways of doing technology ethics. In other words, we claim that technology ethics is performed by how ‘technology’ is defined in the first place. To substantiate this claim, we zoom in on classical philosophy of technology and the empirical turn, arguing that conceptualizations of technology in each respective cluster performed a different way of (not) doing technology ethics.

A high-level virtue ethics approach to situations of deep uncertainty would complement and/or contrast with consequentialist and deontological approaches to uncertainty. Such an account would satisfy the following criteria: (1) it provides normative guidance that allows individuals and societies to cope with deep uncertainty ethically and sustainably in the presence of strong emotions of fear, apprehension, and anxiety; (2) it allows for responsiveness to unexpected situations (“black swans” (Taleb 2007)); and (3) it is realistically accessible to ordinary people. 

Are social media companies responsible for disinformation? Studies of how algorithms prioritize information suggest that social media significantly contributes to the spread of disinformation. However, the theoretical resources for making sense of responsibility for spreading falsehoods are limited. A testimonial view of responsibility holds that information conduits like Facebook are not responsible. On this view, platforms are merely sources of information, and the proper locus of responsibility is rather with originators (Fricker, 2012).

In quantum technologies such as quantum computing, quantum sensing and quantum communication, engineers are working towards ingenious ways in which quantum states can be created, manipulated, exploited, and read out. However, how to comprehend the nature of such quantum states physically and metaphysically is far from obvious. With this development of quantum technologies gaining traction in recent decades, an argument can be made for the renewed importance of working towards a better understanding of both the physical and conceptual reality upon which these technologies rest.

As quantum technologies (QT) continue to progress and mature, the need to establish an ethical framework for their development becomes increasingly apparent. This urgency is emphasized by QT's significant geopolitical and corporate value, with global actors increasingly investing considerable resources into the technology.

In this contribution, I set out an argument for an approach to quantum ethics that takes into account the importance of the attribution of ‘meaning’ to a new technology (cf. Grunwald, 2017). Ethical debates and debates about responsibility emerge from the intertwining of scientific expectations or projections and their possible social meanings. Meanings can be considered a form of intervention; while they do not necessarily fix the meaning of the technology under discussion, they can still have real impact on how debates are carried out.

In this contribution I argue that non-physicist expert citizens play an active role in giving meaning to quantum technologies.